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Introduction 
 The final sentence of my last contribution to this journal, which was written in response 
to a 2014 article by Charles Foster,i expressed a hope that it should ‘not be the last word on the 
potential for the actio iniuriarum to influence medical jurisprudence in mixed and Common 
law jurisdictions, but rather that it should serve to provoke further discussion’.ii I am therefore 
heartened to see that Professor Foster has deigned to reply to that piece with a well-considered 
and erudite article of his owniii and I am grateful to him for choosing to do so. 
 Foster’s reply is critical of several aspects of my piece, oftentimes for good reason. It 
may be said that I missed the mark somewhat in invoking the jurisprudence of ‘dignity’ in 
respect of his rather more narrow contention that medical ethics and bioethics lack analytical 
tools of this kind.iv With that said, as Waldron noted in his lecture on Dignity, Rank, and 
Rights,v ‘dignity seems at home in law’ and, indeed, seems to be a distinctly legal idea co-opted 
by moral philosophers.vi In line with Foster’s own contention that ‘to give an account of rights 
and respect, one necessarily has to resort to the principles on which those ideas are based… 
one is likely to get more satisfactory answers if one starts from the parent principle,vii it is here 
submitted that – insofar as ‘dignity’ is employed in any meaningful sense in moral and ethical 
debate – the principles of this philosophical notion are ultimately derived from the historic 
operation of that principle within the specific sub-discipline of legal philosophy. In many 
important respects, legal philosophy differs significantly between the Common and Civilian 
traditions. As such, if ‘dignity’ is to be afforded any place of prominence as a moral guide, it 
follows that the scope of the legal conception of dignity ought to be examined in full. Given 
the recognised differences between the two major legal families, oxymoronic comparative legal 
scholarship must be regarded as a necessary part of this process. 
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 My previous article did not provide any comprehensive consideration of this subject. 
Within the context of that piece, it was not thought necessary to ‘definitively determine the 
source, nature, relevance and meaning of the broad concept of ‘dignity’ as it exists in legal or 
ethical thought’;viii therein, I sought only to illustrate that dignity could be used – indeed, 
commonly has been used – as a significant, and practically useful, guiding legal principle in 
the manner suggested by Foster. Though Foster agrees that the legal answers which I posited 
in respect of the three scenarios which he and I discussed are ‘plainly right’,ix he nevertheless 
argued that ‘the dangers of erecting a system of law without prior agreement about what dignity 
is are exemplified by the actio iniuriarum… one cannot safely or coherently begin to erect a 
system of law to enshrine and protect dignity unless and until there is broad agreement on the 
substantive notion of dignity involved’.x  
 In response, it is here submitted that there presently exists, at the core of the actio 
iniuriarum, an agreed (amongst judges and jurists, at least) conceptualisation of the nature, 
relevance and meaning of ‘dignity’. Such was not discussed in my original article, but, on the 
basis of Foster’s articulated response, it is accepted that it ought to have been. The actio 
iniuriarum notion of ‘dignity’ is, however, unlikely to be regarded as philosophically sound by 
all commentators, and many of the problems with the actio iniuriarum identified by Foster can 
be said to apply in respect of this conception. Notwithstanding the fact that the law has at times 
‘protected dignity interests adequately – whether or not it has invoked dignity expressly in 
doing so’,xi however, there remains clear cause for a legal mechanism to expressly protect this 
interest and that the existence of such a mechanism clearly repudiates any claim that dignity is 
either useless or vacuous. While such a mechanism could indeed be introduced by primary 
legislation inspired by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), it is thought that 
such cannot be regarded as a solid foundation on which to build lasting and robust apparatus 
of this kind. For that reason, I continue to maintain that, in Scotland, there exists a need for the 
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legal profession to re-connect with the actio iniuriarum and in the Common law world there is 
reason for lawyers, ethicists and moral philosophers to, at the very least, consider the tenets of 
this action in any discourse concerning ‘dignity’.    
The Substance of ‘Dignity’ in the Actio Iniuriarum 
The Romanistic actio iniuriarum can be said to protect ‘dignity’ in two distinct 
iterations. At an ‘operational level’ – that is, at the level of specific, individual claims – the 
actio recognises, and affords protection to, the dignitas of those recognised as legal persons 
(personae).xii At a higher level – indeed, at the core of the action itself – the actio iniuriarum 
also served to safeguard the existimatio of those persons.xiii Like the terms ‘dignity’ and 
dignitas, existimatio was a complex and multifaceted term. The Roman jurist Callistratus 
compounded this definitional difficulty, deigning to define the term as denoting a ‘position of 
unimpaired dignitas, which is established by law and custom’.xiv Though it clearly raises issues 
of its own, given its reliance on the nebulous notion of ‘dignitas’, Callistratus’ definition 
proved influential in the later ius communexv and was used to construct the first operative 
doctrine of personality rights which could be claimed ‘regardless of one’s position or role in 
society’.xvi  
The term existimatio was not discussed in my previous article, due to its focus on the 
practical application, rather than juridical nature, of the actio iniuriarum, but it is here thought 
that a consideration of the concept, alongside a deeper consideration of dignitas, can be used 
to provide a clearer picture of the scope and nature of ‘dignity’ as it subsists within the context 
of the modern action in Scots and South African law. This, it is submitted, may serve to 
alleviate Foster’s concern that broad consensus as to the substantive notion of ‘dignity’ is 
necessary to safely utilise the concept in law. More than this, it is submitted herein that 
existimatio, within the context of the actio iniuriarum, illustrates the fact that the notion of 
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‘dignity’ within iniuria accords, if not completely, at least to a significant extent, with Foster’s 
contention that ‘dignity’ ‘is objective human thriving’.xvii  
The historical discussion contained below serves to illustrate why, in a sense, all 
occasions of iniuria – even those effected against the corpus or fama of the wronged party – 
might be said to be infringements of ‘dignity’ if expressed in the English language. Egregious 
affronts to one’s bodily integrity, or reputation, or privacy each affront one’s existimatio, since 
each of these affronts subject one to contumely or disrespect to which one ought not to be 
subject in civil society. The emphasis on ‘respect’ within the context of the actio iniuriarum 
does, of course, recall Macklin’s dismissive critique of ‘dignity’. The idea that ‘dignity’ can be 
boiled down to no more than ‘respect for persons or for their autonomy’ is, however, 
axiomatically false (whether in the context of the actio iniuriarum or in general). Such is made 
clear by Macklin’s own words. By contending that ‘dignity’ is no more than ‘respect for 
persons or for their autonomy’,xviii Macklin implicitly recognises that the word ‘dignity’ 
captures more than either ‘respect for persons’ or ‘personal autonomy’ manage to do when 
working alone.  
 Respecting a person does not necessarily mean respecting their autonomyxix and it is 
obvious that one may respect a person who has no autonomy (either in the sense of ‘liberty’ to 
act in accordance with that person’s own desires, or the capacity to formulate desires or 
intentions in the first place).xx The concept of ‘dignity’ within iniuria – in the modern sense of 
dignitas and in all conceptualisations of existimatio – does just that; it allows lawyers, judges 
and jurists to balance respect for the person’s autonomously formed wishes with respect for the 
person as an entity with legal personality. The person’s dignity is intimately connected to their 
status as a person (that is, the individual could not lay claim to dignity if they were not 
recognised as a ‘person’), but it remains distinct from their personhood. Thus, the actio 
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iniuriarum is ultimately about preserving ‘dignity’ as a legal interest, rather than simply 
ensuring respect for persons, or respect for the autonomy of those persons.  
Dignitas was regarded by the Romans, the jurists of the ius commune and modern Scots 
and South Africa lawyers as a broad and versatile interest which essentially extends to cover 
any non-patrimonial ‘personality right’
xxiii
xxi not connected to or vested in one’s body or 
reputation.xxii Although dignitas might now be understood as specifically ‘human dignity’, 
such would appear to be inaccurate within the context of Roman law itself, particularly given 
that slaves – though human beings – were deemed to have no dignitas.  Dignitas was 
intimately connected with social standing; the term was fundamentally exclusive, rather than 
inclusive. Those who were considered personae were afforded at least some measure of 
recognised dignitas, while those who were excluded from this category were not. Slaves had 
no standing in society – they were not personae – and so their social standing could not be 
lowered by their subjection to iniuriae.xxiv  Even among personae, dignitas was asymmetrical. 
The dignitas of all personas was afforded protection by means of the actio iniuriarum, ‘but 
one’s degree of dignity, and consequently the level of protection which one enjoyed, differed 
with societal status.’xxv  It was not until the fifteenth century that the word dignitas, or even the 
term dignitas hominis, came to be associated with what we might today recognise as ‘human 
dignity’.xxvi 
That is not to say that the Romans did not recognise an analogue to the modern 
philosophical notion of ‘human dignity’. Cicero, for instance, ostensibly recognised dignitas 
as a feature of all humankind in his De Officiis, tying the ‘dignity of man’ to the ‘persona of 
reason’ which separates human beings from other animals.xxvii With that said, however, 
Cicero’s conception cannot be regarded as the progenitor of the modern understanding of 
‘dignity’ within the actio iniuriarum. Though a lawyer, Cicero was not a jurist and nor was he, 
here, seeking to expound a technical or legal definition of dignitas. Indeed, the notion of 
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dignitas which he described was not an ‘interest’ worthy of protection at all, but rather an 
obligation, to which human beings were subject by dint of their ability to reason, to live in 
accordance with austere (stoic) Roman principles. In Foster’s words, Cicero’s interpretation of 
dignitas thus set the stage for the emergence of ‘an understanding of dignity that rendered it 
almost useless in any medical or bioethical context’.xxviii 
Existimatio then, rather than dignitas, ought to be regarded as the starting point in any 
consideration of the legal notion of ‘human dignity’ within the actio iniuriarum. This is so in 
spite of the fact that the word existimatio is typically (though not exclusively) used in a ‘non-
technical’ sense in the Roman sources.xxix Indeed, it is because of its proliferation in non-legal 
discourse that human non-persons were deemed to enjoy at least some measure of existimatio, 
in spite of the fact that they were ordinarily barred from claiming dignitas. In effect, the word 
existimatio was used by the Romans to describe an intrinsic ‘human dignity’ shared by all 
human beings in society. This conceptualisation of ‘human dignity’ was, like dignitas, 
asymmetrical and it was fundamentally tied to one’s social role or civic purpose. It was, 
however, distinct from one’s social standing. A slave had no social standing to defend, but they 
obviously had to fulfil a certain civic purpose. Existimatio was, thus, possessed by all and could 
only be legitimately violated by state-mandated punishment following forensic process.xxx  
As noted by Giltaij, ‘iniuria as a delict sanctioning transgressions against someone 
else’s existimatio could be traced back as far as Labeo or even earlier in the late Republic’.
xxxii
xxxiii
xxxi 
Though slaves possessed some measure of existimatio, it remained the case that they had no 
recourse to remedy in the event of its infringement. With that said, although no slave could 
raise an actio iniuriarum, a slave’s owner (their dominus) would be deemed to be injured if 
another contumeliously affronted that slave, the owner being taken to have suffered an 
indignity as a result.  This instance of iniuria against the dominus would be aggravated if 
the slave held an important job.  Since, however, the slave alone had no dignitas, it is 
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difficult to conceptualise the aggravation as being contingent on the greater social standing 
bestowed on the slave by dint of their office. Rather, it must be concluded that iniuria inflicted 
on an important slave was aggravated as a result of the increased level of existimatio possessed 
by that slave; their social role, if not standing, was recognised as important and therefore they 
were recognised as possessing a greater measure of ‘human dignity’ (or, at least, a progenitor 
of our modern understanding of that term).  
As a concept intimately connected with one’s good name in society – as one who fails 
to discharge their societal role is bound to lower their own existimatio – most commentators 
have typically conceptualised existimatio as reputational in nature: more ‘civil honour’ than 
‘human dignity’.xxxiv
xxxvi
xxxvii
 Such is unsurprising; the notion that slaves might have human dignity by 
dint of their status as slaves appears anathema to later conceptualisations of ‘dignity’ drawn 
from dignitas; indeed, even the Romans recognised that slavery was contrary to the ius naturale 
and an invention of the ius gentium.xxxv Further to this, it is, of course, ‘hard to think of an idea 
more repellent to modern lawyers… than that of human beings having different degrees of 
worth in the eyes of the law and of society in general’.  As Descheemaeker and Scott note, 
however, though this ‘asymmetric’ notion of dignitas and existimatio is historically bound up 
with the actio iniuriarum, the delict of iniuria is capable of being conceived of as ‘an attack 
on dignity considered in and by itself… held in the same measure by all’.   
Both dignitas and existimatio have retained their fundamentally social character within 
the context of the modern actio iniuriarum. They have, however, been ‘levelled-up’ in the 
sense described by Whitman; that is to say that while unimpeachable existimatio and dignitas 
were once consequences of high status, they have since come to be conceived of as features 
accorded equally to, and shared by, all in society.xxxviii The concept of existimatio proved more 
influential than that of dignitas in the ‘levelling-up’ process which ‘human dignity’ underwent 
in the ius commune literature pertaining to the actio iniuriarum. In constructing a modern 
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subjective right to dignity within the actio iniuriarum, the 16th century Donellus drew upon 
Callistratus’ conception of existimatio, rather than the more intuitive Ulpianic conception of 
dignitas.xxxix Donellus’ innovation, according to Waider, marks a break from the earlier 
asymmetric notion of ‘dignity’ as a simple matter of social status.xl  
Within the context of Donellus’ conception of iniuria, therefore, both ‘dignity’ and 
‘human dignity’ were inclusive terms which represented rights to be respected by others, free 
from insult and to live in a society which upheld boni mores – ‘good morals’. Indeed, the extent 
to which one might claim a right to respect or to freedom from insult was and is dependent on 
society’s conceptualisation of ‘good morals’; this nebulous term fundamentally subsists at the 
core of both the inclusive and the exclusive interpretations of ‘dignity’ and ‘human dignity’ 
within the context of the actio iniuriarum.    
Boni Mores and the Actio Iniuriarum 
In his response to my article, Foster posed a fair question which was not clearly 
answered in my first piece: ‘who is to say that a defendant’s action has compromised or 
threatened my dignitas?’ In suggesting some answers to this question, Foster posits that the 
conception of dignity present in an open-ended actio iniuriarum might lead to a free-for-all in 
which untold masses of individuals might raise actions founded on disrespect to the eventual 
detriment of (as but one example) free speech.xli This would, indeed, be the case if 
infringements of dignity, or occasions of disrespect, were determined wholly subjectively, by 
the affronted party alone. This is not, however, how infringements of dignity are determined 
within the context of the actio iniuriarum. 
The measure of ‘infringements’ of dignity is, as I noted in my previous piece, partly 
subjective and partly objective.xlii The subjective aspect of iniuria is can be determined by the 
claimant’s timeous raising of the action, without them having previously personally barred 
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themselves from doing so by, say, forgiving the wrongdoer for their transgression. The fact 
that the claimant has been so incensed as to resort to litigation in the event of a perceived affront 
is not sufficient for them to achieve legal remedy for the slight by means of an actio iniuriarum; 
they must also establish that there objectively exists a reason for them to have been affronted 
by this conduct. Thus, in order to succeed in their legal action, they must show that the conduct 
of the wrongdoer was contumelious and contra bonos mores (i.e., ‘contrary to good 
morals’).xliii 
 Contumelia has been defined in a variety of ways, but Ibbetson has convincingly 
established that the most appropriate translation of this Latin term would be ‘hubris’ – i.e., one 
who behaves contumeliously behaves hubristically, displaying wanton disrespect towards the 
status of their victim. Sufficiently gross hubris will be regarded as contra bonos mores and so 
self-evidently satisfy the requirements of iniuria, but certain sources suggest that the 
requirement that the conduct be contra bonos mores is a separate requirement running parallel 
to the requirement of contumelia.xliv The answer is, ultimately, moot, however, as the extent to 
which the wrongdoer’s conduct can be described as contumelious is largely dependent on 
judicial interpretation of boni mores.   
 As emphasised by Strauss, the measure of boni mores is not to be understood as ‘the 
customs or society or a particular social group, or of all ethical rules prevailing in society’, 
but rather as ‘the juristic notions (‘regsopvattinge’) of society’.xlv These notions are not, 
generally, expressed in exact rules and so Strauss concedes that the standard is ‘admittedly 
vague’, however it is also noted that such is not necessarily problematic, since the standard is 
largely analogous to that of ‘public policy’. ‘Public policy’ justifications are routinely 
employed in Common law jurisdictions and it is clear that ‘there is a great deal of unanimity 
in Western communities’ as to the type of conduct which can be said to run contrary to such.xlvi 
On Strauss’ conception, therefore, conduct which contumeliously harms an individual’s legally 
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protected interests in a manner which runs contrary to ‘public policy’ might be described as an 
attack on that individual’s ‘dignity’. 
It is here submitted that it is for this reason that Foster is correct in saying that ‘the law 
often protects dignity interests adequately without a sophisticated dignity analysis’;xlvii the 
tools to allow it to do so are common to Common, Civilian and mixed jurisprudence, even if 
such is not expressly articulated. So, too, is Foster correct in noting that the actio iniuriarum 
represents ‘the rule’ (that the law does, or ought to, seek to safeguard ‘dignity’); my submission 
was, and is, simply that as the actio iniuriarum represents a clear case in which the law has not 
shied away from the language of ‘dignity’. Following this, as there exists scholarship linking 
the concept of ‘dignity’ within the actio iniuriarum to the well-known and oft-employed 
standards of ‘public policy’, any scholarship which seeks to engage with the idea of ‘dignity’ 
as a meaningful concept ought to consider occasions in which the notion has been expressly 
juridically employed. 
It is manifestly apparent that ‘infringements of dignity are easier to detect than to 
define’.xlviii One can readily agree that instances of serious assault, or rape, or ‘revenge porn’ 
affront the dignity of the victim.xlix Such is not to say that there is any one universal or 
universalisable conception of ‘dignity’, which all persons in all places at all times will regard 
to have been affronted by the commission of certain specific conduct. That this is not the case 
is evident from the historical enquiry carried out in the previous section. Rather, this account 
simply posits that human beings, across space and time, share the ability to recognise occasions 
in which their societal conception of ‘dignity’ has been affronted, even if there exists no prior 
or explicit guidance condemning such novel conduct as wrongful.l If a sufficient number of 
persons within society regard certain conduct as an affront to dignity, then that conduct will be 
deemed contra bonos mores and so proscribed by law – either expressly, by dint of written and 
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specific rules, or de facto only, by dint of specific judicial pronouncement in light of facts 
which lead the judges to conclude that a dignity interest has been infringed.li  
The legal and societal conception of boni mores is liable to change rapidly; significant 
shifts in the conceptualisation of conduct which contravenes ‘public policy’ can occur in a very 
short space of time. Consider the long-time practice of tabloid newspapers publically ‘outing’, 
as homosexual, those with a public profile. Throughout the 20th century, it was regarded as a 
matter of public interest that the identities of ‘closeted’ individuals should be made known in 
the media, particularly while homosexual conduct remained a criminal offence and thereafter 
due to the dictate of ‘section 28’.lii By the new millennium, however, public opinion had 
manifestly turned against the press on this matter, as tabloid readers had come to ‘find 
unwarranted intrusion offensive’.liii Thus, ‘outing’ a public figure is now seen as a gross 
invasion of privacy, one to which an appeal to ‘freedom of expression’ is no answer. This, it is 
submitted, would make the occurrence of a public ‘outing’ actionable as iniuria, since the 
determination of such would ultimately turn on the question of whether or not the defender’s 
actions were contra bonos mores and, at present, ‘outing’ most certainly is contra bonos mores. 
The application, or potential application, of this standard to medical law, medical ethics 
and bioethics is clear; indeed, in her 2012 piece on the ‘medical exception’ – the rule precluding 
the prosecution of a physician who, acting in good faith, carries out a legitimate medical 
operationliv – Lewis emphasised the place of ‘public policy’ in determining the legitimacy of 
medical treatment.lv As discussed above, ‘public policy’ is analogous to the conception of boni 
mores within the context of the actio iniuriarum, which consequently informs the notions of 
‘dignity’ and ‘human dignity’ as they operate within this mechanism. Lewis’ contention that 
new or controversial medical procedures ordinarily come to be accepted not through express 
legislative or judicial change, but rather incrementally as a result of changing public policy, 
can be read as the law responding to changing conceptions of the constitution of boni mores. 
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A procedure which, at one time, might have been regarded as unlawful or illegitimate may 
come to be an accepted form of necessary or elective treatment.lvi On the above analysis, the 
justification for this may be said to be the fact that while, at one time, social and legal mores 
regarded such procedures as affronts to the dignity of the patient, or to society in general, such 
ceased to be the case in line with changing ‘public policy’. 
The flexibility of the measure of boni mores might therefore, indeed, provide a licence 
for a degree of judicial discretion and creativity which would make even a Common lawyer 
who would ordinarily welcome such balk.
lviii
lvii To this, it may be replied that the matter is no 
more problematic than the usual usage of ‘public policy’ as a metric within law. The actio 
iniuriarum does not permit judges to become ‘unfettered legislators’ any more than the ‘fair, 
just and reasonableness’ test within the Caparo criteria did so.  While the use of ‘public 
policy’ as a metric has been robustly criticised, it is nevertheless recognised that some cases 
simply must be decided by reference to matters of policy, and that by their nature such matters 
of policy cannot be set out in stone in advance of the occurrence of all conduct leading to 
actions in which the concept might be invoked. Such cases, it is submitted, are those in which 
recourse to an express and practically useful notion of ‘dignity’ are required. Indeed, as I 
indicated in my previous article, the German courts found exactly this to be the case; when the 
legislature scrapped the actio iniuriarum, the courts were nevertheless forced to construct an 
analogous allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht from references to ‘dignity’ in the Basic Law. This 
marks a clear example of judicial creativity in an otherwise robustly codified Civilian 
jurisdiction.lix 
Whether or not existimatio, or ‘human dignity’, has been affronted within the actio 
iniuriarum is not therefore, as Foster alludes, to be determined by the wronged party alone. 
Rather, it can be said to turn on the following twofold question: Is the conduct in question 
sufficiently contumelious to have subjectively harmed the victim and objectively be termed 
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contra bonos mores (i.e., has the conduct contravened public policy)? If the first answer is yes, 
but the second is no, then the complainer will have no access to legal remedy, in spite of the 
perceived affront to their dignity. If the answer to the first part of the question is no, but the 
second is answered affirmatively, then the ‘victim’ will have no recourse to the civil courts, 
but there may yet be cause for a public action in criminal law. It is only if the answer to both 
parts of the question is affirmative that the victim might successfully plead an infringement of 
dignity and so succeed in an actio iniuriarum. In all cases, the court will be able to determine 
whether or not the defender’s conduct contravened ‘good morals’ by treating such as a public 
policy decision. 
If public policy comes to be that the law should seek to promote, wherever possible, 
‘human flourishing’ in the sense advocated by Foster, then it is submitted that the law would, 
from this, functionally serve to safeguard ‘dignity’ in precisely the manner that he describes. 
This is so on the grounds that the occurrence of iniuria is determined by reference to the 
standard of boni mores, which is itself identical to the English term ‘public policy’. The actio 
iniuriarum would be counted amongst the primary means of furthering the objective set by 
Foster, but it certainly would not be the only legal mechanism which could be employed to do 
so. The point that I made in my initial article consequently stands; in dignity discourse, there 
is a clear need for oxymoronic comparative law. In the absence of such, a vital conceptual tool 
which can be used to further the cause of ‘dignity’, as a practical and useful legal or 
philosophical concept, may well tragically be lost. 
Dignity, Iniuria and Article 8 
 The loss of the actio iniuriarum in Scotland would, it is submitted, likewise be tragic. 
The action was much-maligned in the Roman-Dutch jurisprudence of the 20th centurylx and the 
delict of iniuria has not been utilised to its full potential within Scots law as a result.lxi 
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Nevertheless, as indicated in my previous article, this mechanism could be used to afford 
redress to those who have suffered an affront to dignity, howsoever caused. The delict does not 
rely on a ‘pigeonhole system of nominate torts’, as does English law;lxii nor does it require any 
‘public’ element, as do English crimes such as outraging public decency. A successful actio 
iniuriarum requires no more than a juridical determination that the human dignity of the 
pursuer was affronted by the conduct of the wrongdoer. 
More significant than this potential as a practical tool for the purposes of this article, 
however, is the potential for scholars and advocates of ‘dignity’ to utilise the copious 
scholarship concerning the actio iniuriarum and the delict of iniuria in constructing a robust 
legal and philosophical concept of dignity. In Scotland, indeed, there is something of an 
imperative for jurists and legal practitioners to engage with this material, precisely because 
Article 8 of the ECHR has been ‘brought home’ by the Human Rights Act 1998.lxiii Since the 
introduction of this legislation, the ECHR rights may be regarded as ‘new and fundamental 
sources of public policy when developing common law areas particularly affected by such 
considerations’;lxiv tort law and the Scots law of delict are each expressly conceived of as areas 
so affected.lxv  
The ECHR has given those jurisdictions which subscribe to its tenets the means to place 
dignity at the core of their conception of private law in this ‘age of rights’.
lxvii
lxvi To that extent, I 
agree with Foster – indeed, I truly hope that he is right in saying that ‘the Scots law of the actio 
iniuriarum is likely to evolve well because it must and will evolve with the benefit of the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence on dignity’.  Within the context of the UK, however, the fragility 
of the constitutional arrangement in respect of the ECHR is such that it cannot be taken for 
granted that this instrument will continue to directly apply in domestic jurisprudence in all time 
coming. Those holding high office have consistently railed against the Human Rights Act 1998 
of late and the move to repeal this legislation and replace it with a so-called and nondescript 
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‘British Bill of Rights’ gained pace until the loss of the Conservative Parliamentary majority 
in 2017.lxviii Strasbourg jurisprudence pertaining to dignity would, of course, continue to grow 
even in the absence of the justiciability of the ECHR within the UK’s domestic courts, or indeed 
in the absence of the UK’s ascription to the Convention. This would be of little utility to UK-
based litigants, who could no longer rely on its tenets for legal protection in domestic law. The 
imperative for Scotland to develop her common law relating to the actio iniuriarum is therefore 
apparent. In order to protect individual interests in ‘dignity’, a private law mechanism to afford 
redress in the event of infringements of this interest is necessary. Such, as Foster recognises, 
has the added benefit of being justiciable against private persons, as well as public bodies.lxix     
Although I take some issue with his use of the definitive article, I do not disagree in 
principle with Foster’s claim that ‘Article 8 of the ECHR is the natural legal vehicle for the 
idea of human dignity’.lxx For as long as it retains its place in domestic law, Article 8 is a fine 
vehicle for dignity to employ in travelling to its proper place of prominence in bioethics and 
jurisprudence. The ECHR is not, however, as Foster contended in his 2014 piece, ‘the natural 
home of dignity’.lxxi Dignity made its home in the actio iniuriarum for some two millennia 
before Article 8 was more than a glint in the eye of the drafters of the Convention. This implies 
that the place of dignity within the actio iniuriarum – whether in its ancient or modern contexts 
– ought to be considered by those who seek to make use of the term as a guiding moral or legal 
principle. 
The lack of consideration paid to the actio iniuriarum in ECHR jurisprudence itself is 
not surprising, since the actio as described herein and in my previous piece does not now exist 
in Europe outside of one small jurisdiction, which is generally outshone on the international 
stage by its larger neighbour. Further to this, though the action has flourished in post-apartheid 
South Africa, the action has been severely neglected in Scotland. The comparative obscurity 
of the actio iniuriarum within modern Europe does not detract from its potential utility 
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however; as I argued in my last article, within Scotland, it is not too late for the action to be 
revived in full and in the rest of the United Kingdom there exists cause for the introduction of 
some comparable concept. If there is need for primary legislation to introduce a means of 
expressly protecting ‘dignity’ throughout England, Wales and Northern Ireland, however, such 
should not – as Foster suggests – draw only from ‘the dignity principles that are at the core of 
the ECHR’.lxxii Rather, such legislation should draw on the delict of iniuria in order to give the 
courts the flexibility to deal with all potential infringements of dignity in their myriad forms.  
For that reason, it is submitted that the actio iniuriarum ought to be utilised as a ‘light 
to nations’, to use Foster’s words, though of course it ought not to be the only light. One cannot 
now obtain a clear picture of the place of ‘dignity’ in bioethics or law without engaging with 
jurisprudence from Strasbourg, or commentary concerning the proliferation of the concept of 
‘dignity’ in the post-Second World War international instruments. But such is precisely my 
point. In the scholarship of ‘dignity’, in order to obtain the clearest possible picture of what the 
term means, if it is to be thought of as more than mere vacuous window-dressing, it behoves 
scholars to make use of all available resources in constructing their case that ‘dignity’ is of use 
as a doctrinal and philosophical tool or principle in legal and ethical debate. The actio 
iniuriarum is another tool in the lawyer’s toolkit and, as ‘dignity’ might be described as a 
juristic notion which has been adopted by moral philosophers and ethicists, the notion of 
‘dignity’ as it subsists within this legal mechanism ought to be considered in setting out any 
refutation of the claim that the whole concept is utterly vacuous.   
Conclusion 
 In response to my article, Foster argued five distinct points. I believe that in the course 
of this article, I have addressed the key concerns raised in that response. It has been established 
that within the context of the actio iniuriarum there is – broad – agreement as to the substantive 
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notion of ‘dignity’ central to that legal mechanism. This fact means that the actio iniuriarum 
does not exemplify the dangers of constructing a system of law without prior agreement as to 
the nature of dignity; indeed, the robust and useful conception of dignity present in the actio 
iniuriarum is interpreted in line with a legal metric that is well-known even in Common law 
jurisdictions. 
At the core of the legal conception of ‘dignity’ within iniuria is this concept of boni 
mores. This notion is both broad and flexible enough to describe ‘human flourishing’ in the 
sense articulated by Foster. The term is, in essence, synonymous with that of ‘public policy’. 
For this reason, the introduction of a conception of ‘dignity’ akin to that contained in the actio 
iniuriarum could not be taken as a licence for the judiciary to act as unfettered legislators; at 
least, no more or less so than such a charge can presently be laid at the door of judges who 
engaging with matters of ‘public policy’. 
It has long been the case that the law has been able to adequately protect dignity 
interests without invoking the language of dignity expressly. It is, however, submitted that the 
Common law’s capacity to do so would be better understood if more scholars of dignity were 
to concern themselves with an examination of dignity within the context of the actio 
iniuriarum. The link between the notion of boni mores and the contemporary idea of ‘public 
policy’ is clear and so it is concluded that Romanistic ideas of dignity are present in the 
Common law, even if such remain unarticulated. A more detailed oxymoronic comparative 
legal study of ‘dignity’ could shed further light on the true extent and nature of this link. 
It is hoped, as Foster posits, that the actio iniuriarum will be the beneficiary of 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, but it is submitted that the jurisprudence of the ECHR is not, alone, 
sufficient to properly protect ‘dignity’ within the context of domestic law in either Scotland or 
the rest of the United Kingdom. The precariousness of the ECHR (or, rather, the Human Rights 
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Act) within the UK is such that in Scotland there is, or ought to be, an impetus to precipitate 
the place of the actio iniuriarum in this jurisdiction. Even with this practical concern aside, 
however, there remains a case for – if nothing else – consideration of the place of the actio 
iniuriarum in dignity scholarship. This is especially the case if there is to be talk of the 
introduction of primary legislation with a view to protecting dignity interests; in order to craft 
such legislation, consideration of all legal sources pertinent to this complex, multifaceted and 
often unpopular philosophical construct is necessary.  
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